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Abstract—We propose a distributed feedback control that
steers a dynamical network to a prescribed equilibrium cor-
responding to the so-called Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The
network dynamics considered here are a class of passive nonlinear
second-order systems, where production and demands act as
external inputs to the systems. While productions are assumed
to be controllable at each node, the demand is determined
as a function of local prices according to the utility of the
consumers. Using reduced information on the demand, the
proposed controller guarantees the convergence of the closed
loop system to the optimal equilibrium point dictated by the
Cournot-Nash competition.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in con-
trollers that can steer a given dynamical system to an optimal
steady state, mostly motivated by research connected to power
networks, where, for instance, given a certain demand, the
problem of dynamically adjusting the generation in order to
satisfy the demand while fulfilling an optimal criterion at
steady state, e.g., minimizing the generation costs or maximiz-
ing the social welfare, has been formulated and addressed with
different approaches. Other application domains of interests
are flow and heat networks, data centers as well as logistic
systems.
Loosely speaking, the proposed approaches to dynami-
cally control networks while fulfilling steady-state optimality
criteria can be classified in two categories. One relies on
primal-dual gradient algorithms, which solve the optimization
problem, and apply on-line the computed control input to
the physical network, possibly taking into account feedback
signals coming from the network for improved robustness [1],
[2], [3], [4]. This approach returns control algorithms that can
handle general convex objective functions and constraints but
typically requires either a good knowledge of the demand, or
a number of measurements of network variables, sometimes
more than what is really available in practice.
A second category relies on internal-model based controllers
[5], [6], [7], popularized under the acronym DAPI (distributed
averaging proportional integral controllers) [8], which can
typically deal with linear-quadratic cost functions only, but can
on the other hand tackle uncertainty in the power demand.
This paper aims at contributing to the second category of
results allowing for some degree of uncertainty in the demand
and considering an economic objective which is different
from the ones considered so far – economic optimal dispatch,
implemented via a distributed [5], [6] or a semi-decentralized
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control architecture [9]. In fact, our interest is to design
controllers at the producers that aim at maximizing their profit
according to a Cournot model of competition [10].
Other works are available that have solved problems differ-
ent from the economic optimal dispatch problem, e.g., [11],
[12], where algorithms solving the optimal power generation
model under a Bertrand model of competition and a primal-
dual setting have been proposed.
Cournot models of competition, and the resulting Cournot-
Nash equilibrium [13], [14], [15] are very well studied topics
in game theory. Pseudo-gradient dynamical algorithms that
converge to Cournot-Nash equilibria have been extensively
investigated in the literature [16], [17], [18].
What differentiates our results from the existing one are two
features. First, as highlighted before, we devise a feedback
control algorithm that does not rely on the exact knowledge
of the demand in the network. Second, this algorithm is
interconnected in a feedback loop with a given physical
network, and the resulting closed-loop system is analyzed as
a whole, showing that the physical network converge to an
equilibrium at which the controller output equals the value
of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since the controller state
variable has the interpretation of a price, we at times refer to
the feedback control also as a pricing mechanism.
Although the motivation for this investigation was inspired
by problems in power networks, in order to convey the results
to an audience that is not necessarily interested to power
networks, we decided to present our results for a class of
nonlinear second-order passive dynamical networks [19], in
which power networks fall after suitable modifications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we recall basic concepts and results about the
Cournot model of competition. Section III contains the main
results of the paper, namely the design and analysis of a
distributed feedback controller steering the closed-loop system
towards a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. A numerical case study
is discussed in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn in Section
V.
II. COURNOT COMPETITION
In this section, we revisit a few results about the Cournot
model of competition ([13], [10]), which are used to determine
the optimal triple of supply, demand and price. This charac-
terization is instrumental to formulate our main results in the
next section, where a dynamic controller is designed to steer
a given network to such optimal Cournot triple.
In a model of Cournot competition, n producers produce a
homogeneous good that is demanded by m consumers. The
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2price p of the good is assumed to be determined by the good
productions, while the consumers are price takers, a scenario
motivated by having few producers and many consumers.
Each producer i aims at maximizing its profit
Πgi: Rn≥0 → R, given the production of other firms. The
profit is defined by the objective function
Πgi(Pgi, P−gi) = p(Pg)Pgi−Cgi(Pgi), i ∈ I := {1, 2, . . . , n},
where Pgi ∈ R≥0 is the good production by producer i,
Pg = col(Pg1, . . . , Pgn) ∈ Rn is the vector of all the
productions, P−gi ∈ Rn−1 is the vector obtained by removing
the ith element of Pg , p : Rn → R is the price function,
and Cgi : R≥0 → R is a function satisfying the following
assumption [13]:
Assumption 1. For each i, the cost function Cgi is convex,
non-decreasing and continuously differentiable for Pgi ∈ R≥0.
Moreover, Cgi(0) = 0.
Given a price p ∈ R, each consumer j wants to maximize
its utility, described by the function
Πdj(Pdj , p) = Uj(Pdj)− pPdj , j ∈ J := {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
where Pdj ∈ R≥0 is the good demand by consumer j and
Uj : R≥0 → R is a continuously differentiable function. To
ease the notation, in the sequel, we denote p simply by p.
Now, given a price p ∈ R, we consider the utility maximisation
problem
sup
Pdj≥0
Πdj(Pdj , p) (1)
Assumption 2. For each j ∈ J the utility function Uj :
R≥0 → R is continuously differentiable and strictly concave.
Moreover, U ′j : R≥0 → R satisfies limPdj→+∞ U ′j(Pdj) =
−∞ and U ′j(0) > 0.
A. Utility Maximisation
The utility maximisation problem admits the following
solution:
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 2 hold. Then, Pdj is solution
to (1) if and only if
Pdj = pij(p), (2)
where pij : R→ R≥0 is defined as
pij(λ) =
{
(U ′j)
−1(λ) if λ<U ′j(0)
0 if λ≥U ′j(0).
(3)
Proof. The proof descends from the KKT conditions. 
B. Supply-demand matching
As will be discussed in Section III, we are interested in a
supply-demand balancing condition, where the total generation
is equal to the total demand, namely
1>Pg = 1>Pd, (4)
where Pd = (Pd1, . . . , Pdm) and 1 denotes the vector of all
ones of suitable size. Under this balancing condition, the price
can be written as a function of the total production, as stated
next.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 2 and the balance equation (4)
hold, with 1>Pg ≥ 0. Then, there exists a continuous function
u : R≥0 → R satisfying
u(1>Pg) = p(Pg) (5)
with the following properties: (i) u(0) > 0; (ii) u is strictly
decreasing; (iii) limq→+∞ u(q) = −∞.
Proof. In view of Assumption 2, the functions pij(λ) in (2)
are continuous with range equal to the whole R≥0. Each func-
tion pij(λ) is strictly decreasing on the interval (−∞, U ′j(0)]
and identically zero on the interval [U ′j(0),+∞). Define the
function pi(λ):=
∑
j∈J pij(λ). This is a continuous function
with range equal to the whole R≥0. Moreover it is strictly
decreasing on (−∞,maxj U ′j(0)] and identically zero on the
interval [maxj U ′j(0),+∞). Let q := pi(λ). Then, the function
pi can be inverted, on the interval where q ∈ R>0, to obtain
λ = pi−1(q). Now, we define u : R≥0 → R as
u(q) =
{
pi−1(q) if q > 0
pi−1(0+) if q = 0,
(6)
where limq→0+ pi−1(q) =: pi−1(0+). By construction, u is a
continuous function, which is strictly decreasing and satisfies
the properties (i), (ii), (iii) of the statement. Moreover, by
substituting q = 1>Pg in (6), using (2) together with the
balancing condition (4), and noting monotonicity of u, we
obtain the equality (5). 
Example 1. Consider the case of 2 consumers with linear-
quadratic utility functions
Uj(Pdj) = −1
2
PdjQdjPdj + bdjPdj ,
where Qdj , bdj > 0, j = 1, 2. For each j, we have
pij(λ) =
{
Q−1dj (bdj − λ) if λ < bdj
0 if λ ≥ bdj . (7)
Let bd1 < bd2. Then
pi(λ) =

∑
j=1,2
Q−1dj (bdj − λ) if λ ≤ bd1
Q−1d2 (bd2 − λ) if bd1<λ ≤ bd2
0 if λ>bd2
and for q = pi(λ), q > 0, we have
pi−1(q) =
{ −Qd2q + bd2 if 0 < q ≤ Q−1d2 (bd2 − bd1)
−αq + β if q ≥ Q−1d2 (bd2 − bd1)
where
β =
∑
j=1,2
bdj
Qdj∑
j=1,2
1
Qdi
, α =
1∑
j=1,2
1
Qdi
.
It then follows that
u(q) =
{ −Qd2q + bd2 if 0 ≤ q ≤ Q−1d2 (bd2 − bd1)
−αq + β if q ≥ Q−1d2 (bd2 − bd1).

3In view of (2) and (5), we conclude that the optimal
demands are given by
Pdj =
{
(U ′j)
−1(u(1>Pg)) if u(1>Pg) < U ′j(0)
0 if u(1>Pg) ≥ U ′j(0). (8)
By construction, the optimal demand Pd detailed above satis-
fies 1>Pd = 1>Pg .
C. Profit Maximisation: the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Motivated by the discussion before, we consider a Cournot
game consisting of the set of producers I each one aiming at
solving the maximisation problem
max
Pgi≥0
Πgi(Pgi, P−gi), (9)
with
Πgi(Pgi, P−gi) = p(Pg)Pgi − Cgi(Pgi). (10)
More formally, we define the Cournot game as follows:
Definition 1. A Cournot game CG(I, (Πgi, i ∈ I)) consists
of
i) A set I of producers (or players);
ii) A strategy Pgi ∈ R for each producer i ∈ I;
iii) The convex and closed set Rn≥0 of allowed strategies Pg =
(Pg1, . . . , Pgn);
iv) A payoff function Πgi(Pgi, P−gi), where for Pg ∈ Rn≥0,
Πgi(Pg) is continuous in Pg and concave in Pgi for each
fixed P−gi.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is defined next [13]:
Definition 2. A Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game
CG(I, (Πgi, i ∈ I)) is a vector P ?g ∈ Rn≥0 that for each i ∈ I
satisfies
Πgi(P
?
gi, P
?
−gi) ≥ Πgi(Pgi, P ?−gi)
for all Pgi ∈ R≥0.
The existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a conse-
quence of a well-know result on concave games due to [20].
Let us recall the definition of a concave game.
Definition 3. A concave game consists of
i) A set I of players;
ii) A strategy xi ∈ Rpi for each player i ∈ I;
iii) The convex, closed and bounded set R ⊂ Rp of allowed
strategies x = (x1, . . . , xn), with p =
∑n
i=1 pi;
iv) A payoff function ϕi(xi, x−i) for each player i ∈ I , where
for x ∈ S, ϕi(x) is continuous in x and concave in xi
for each fixed x−i, with S = P1× . . .×Pn and Pi is the
projection of R on Rmi .
A difference between a Cournot and a concave game is the
lack of a bounded set of bounded strategies for the Cournot
game (Rn≥0 is clearly unbounded). However, following [13,
Proposition 2], it can be shown that solving (9) is equivalent
to solving
max
0≤Pgi≤P¯gi
Πgi(Pgi, P−gi), (11)
with P¯gi some positive constant. As a matter of fact,
Πgi(Pgi, P−gi) = u(1>Pg)Pgi−Cgi(Pgi) is zero at Pgi = 0,
and by Assumptions 1, 2 and Proposition 2, there exists
P¯gi > 0 such that Πgi(P¯gi, P−gi) = 0 and Πgi(Pgi, P−gi) < 0
for Pgi ≥ P¯gi. Hence, in the case of (11), R = S = [0, P¯g1]×
. . . × [0, P¯gn]. Moreover, the payoff function Πgi(Pgi, P−gi)
satisfies the properties of a concave game by Assumptions 1,
2 and Proposition 2. Therefore the game defined by (11), or
equivalently by (9), is a concave game. It can then be con-
cluded by [20, Theorem 1] that a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
exists.
Theorem 1. [20, Theorem 1] Under Assumptions 1 and 2
there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium P ?g .
D. Linear-quadratic utility and cost functions
In this subsection and for the remainder of the paper,
we restrict the cost and utility functions of producers and
consumers to linear-quadratic functions, namely
Cgi(Pgi) =
1
2
PgiQgiPgi + bgiPgi, bgi, Qgi > 0, (12)
Uj(Pdj) = −1
2
PdjQdjPdj + bdjPdj , bdj, Qdj > 0. (13)
Proposition 1 is specialized as follows:
Corollary 1. The scalar Pdj is a solution to (1) with Uj as
in (13) if and only if
Pdj =
{
Q−1dj (bdj − p) if p < bdj
0 if p ≥ bdj (14)
We are particularly interested in the case where all produc-
ers and consumers enter the market, that is Pgi, Pdj > 0 for
all i ∈ I and j ∈ J . Conditions under which this case occurs
are formalised next.
Lemma 1. Let the utility functions of consumers be given by
(13) and consider the utility maximization problem (1). Then,
the following statements are equivalent:
1) There exists Pd ∈ Rn>0 solution to (1).
2) p < bd, where bd := min{bdj : j ∈ J}.
3) The vector Pd given by
Pd = Q
−1
d (b− 1p), (15)
is the unique solution to (1), and p 6= bd.
Proof. See Appendix. 
We note that, given the strictly positive demand (15) in
Lemma 1, the expression can be inverted to obtain
p = β∗ − α∗1>Pd (16)
where
β∗ :=
∑
j∈J
bdi
Qdi∑
j∈J
1
Qdi
=
1>Q−1d bd
1>Q−1d 1
, α∗ :=
1∑
j∈J
1
Qdi
=
1
1>Q−1d 1
,
(17)
4and bd := col(bd1, . . . , bdn), Qd = diag(Qd1, . . . , Qdn),
bg := col(bg1, . . . , bgn), Qg = diag(Qg1, . . . , Qgn).
∗ ∗ ∗
We turn now our attention to the producers. Let the price
function in (9) admit the affine form
p(Pg) = β − α1>Pg (18)
for some scalars α, β > 0, which is motivated by Proposition
2 specialized to the case of linear-quadratic cost functions with
strictly positive generation and demand. In the next section,
the scalars α and β in (18) will be set to those in (17), as we
are interested in the supply-demand matching condition (4).
This will be made more explicit in Theorem 2.
Since Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied in the case of linear-
quadratic functions, Theorem 1 holds and a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium exists. Then, the computation of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium P ?g descends from the optimization problem
P ?gi ∈ arg max
Pgi≥0
Πgi(Pgi, P
?
−gi) (19)
where, in view of (10), (12), (18),
Πgi(Pgi, P−gi) = (β − αPgi − α1>P−gi)Pgi
− 12PgiQgiPgi − bgiPgi.
The conditions under which the parabola (β − αPgi −
α1>P−gi)Pgi− 12PgiQgiPgi− bgiPgi has a nonnegative max-
imizer can be formalized as follows:
Proposition 3. Pgi is a solution to (19) if and only if
Pgi =
{
γi(P−gi)
2α+Qgi
if γi(P−gi) > 0
0 if γi(P−gi) ≤ 0
(20)
with
γi(P−gi) := β − bgi − α
∑
j 6=i:Pgj>0
Pgj .
The proof is omitted.
Recall that we are interested in the case where every pro-
ducer contributes a strictly positive production, i.e. Pg ∈ Rn>0.
This brings us to the following lemma:
Lemma 2. The following statements are equivalent:
1) There exists Pg ∈ Rn>0 solution to (19).
2) The vector Pg given by
Pg = (α(I + 11
>) +Qg)−1(β1− bg), (21)
is the unique solution to (19) and β−α1>Pg 6=bg , where
bg := maxi∈I bgi.
3) (α(I + 11>) +Qg)−1(β1− bg) ∈ Rn>0.
4) The inequality
1>(α(I + 11>) +Qg)−1(β1− bg) < β − bg
α
, (22)
holds.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Summarizing, Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 identify the
optimal production and optimal demand, respectively, for the
cost and utility functions (12) and (13). Lemma 1 characterizes
the conditions under which the optimal demand of each
consumer is strictly positive, and Lemma 2 provides equivalent
conditions for strict positivity of optimal productions. Based
on the aforementioned results, the following necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal triple
(P ?g , P
?
d , p
?) ∈ Rn>0 × Rm>0 × R>0 can be given:
Theorem 2. Let the price function admit the affine form
p(Pg) = β − α1>Pg , for some positive scalars α, β > 0.
For linear-quadratic functions (12), (13), let P ?g denote the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium solution to (19), and P ?d the optimal
demand solution to (1) computed with respect to the optimal
price p? := p(P ?g ). Then, the following are equivalent:
1)
β − bd
α
<1>(α(I + 11>) +Qg)−1(β1− bg)<β − bg
α
.
(23)
2)
P ?g = (α(I + 11
>) +Qg)−1(β1− bg) (24a)
P ?d = Q
−1
d (bd − β1+ α11>P ?g ) (24b)
p? = β − α1>P ?g , (24c)
and bg 6= p? 6= bd.
3) (P ?g , P
?
d , p
?) ∈ Rn>0 × Rm>0 × R>0.
Moreover, in case α = α∗ and β = β∗ with α∗ and β∗ as in
(17), then the balancing condition holds, namely
1>P ?g = 1
>P ?d . (25)
Proof. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, establishing the equiva-
lence of the three statements is straightforward. Now suppose
that α = α∗ and β = β∗. Then equation (24b) becomes
P ?d = Q
−1
d (bd − β∗1+ α∗11>P ?g ).
This yields
1>P ?d = 1
>Q−1d bd − β∗1>Q−1d 1+ α∗1>Q−1d 11TP ?g .
The balancing condition (25) then follows from (17). 
Remark 1. The vector P ?g in (24a) can be rewritten as
P ?g = (αI +Qg)
−1(β1− bg − α11>P ?g )
= (αI +Qg)
−1(1p? − bg). (26)
Hence, the triple (P ?g , P
?
d , p
?) can be equivalently character-
ized by the implicit form
P ?g = (αI +Qg)
−1(1p? − bg), (27a)
P ?d = Q
−1
d (bd − 1p?), (27b)
p? = β − α1>P ?g . (27c)
Remark 2. To give an interpretation to condition (23), we
rewrite it in a different form. By Theorem 2, condition (23)
can be rewritten as
β − bd
α
< 1>P ?g <
β − bg
α
, (28)
5which is equivalent to bg < β − α1>P ?g < bd, or also
C ′i(0) < p(P
?
g ) < U
′
i(0), ∀i ∈ I.
Noting that p(Pg) is monotonically decreasing, the lower
bound yields C ′i(0) < p(0). This means that the marginal
costs of the producers are lower than the price at zero
generation (Pgi = 0). Therefore, the producers always benefit
from providing nonzero amount of goods to the consumers.
Analogously, the upper bound indicates that the marginal
utility of each consumer at zero demand (Pdj = 0) is higher
than the the eventual optimal price p? = p(P ?g ) dictated
by the consumers. Hence, under condition (23), it is always
advantageous for consumers to enter the market and have a
strictly positive demand.
III. COURNOT-NASH OPTIMAL DYNAMICAL NETWORKS
In the previous section, we studied Cournot competition and
characterized the Cournot-Nash equilibrium among producers
and consumers. In this section, we introduce a dynamical
network whose output variables are affected by the cumulative
effect of demand and generation mismatch. Using these vari-
ables as measurements, we devise a dynamic output feedback
algorithm that steers the dynamical network to the Cournot-
Nash optimal solution identified by the triple (P ?g , P
?
d , p
?) with
P ?g = (α
∗(I + 11>) +Qg)−1(β∗1− bg) (29a)
P ?d = Q
−1
d (bd − β∗1+ α∗11>P ?g ) (29b)
p? = β∗ − α∗1>P ?g . (29c)
Note that the triple above is obtained from (27) by setting
α = α∗ and β = β∗. The reason why we are interested in the
latter choice is to ensure that the balancing condition (25) is
met. Moreover, we require a reduced amount of information
about the consumers to allow for the changing demand present
in dynamic interactive markets. Finally, note that the feedback
algorithm should be designed such that the stability of the
physical system is not compromised.
A. Network dynamics
The topology of the network is represented by a con-
nected and undirected graph G(V, E) with a vertex set V =
{1, . . . , n}, and an edge set E given by the set of unordered
pairs {i, j} of distinct vertices i and j. The cardinality of E
is denoted by m1. The set of neighbors of node i is denoted
by Ni = {j ∈ V | {i, j} ∈ E}.
We consider a second-order consensus based network dy-
namics of the form:
mix¨i + dix˙i−
∑
j∈Ni
∇Hij(xi − xj) = ui, (30)
where mi, di ∈ R>0 are constant, Hij : R → R is a
continuously differentiable strictly convex2with its minimum
1The integer m should not be confused with the number of consumers in
the previous section, as the latter is equal to the number of producers in this
section and is denoted by n.
2Locally strictly convex functions can be analogously treated in the analysis,
with the only difference that the convergence result will become local in this
case.
at the origin, ∇Hij denotes the partial derivative of Hij with
respect to its argument xi−xj , xi ∈ R is the state associated to
node i, and ui ∈ R is the input applied to the dynamics of the
ith node. Note that as Hij is strictly convex, ∇Hij is a strictly
increasing function of xi − xj . The second order dynamics
(30) can represent different kind of networks, including power
networks, by appropriately choosing the function Hi, see e.g.
[21], [22]. Producers and consumers affect the dynamics (30)
via
ui = Pgi − Pdi,
where Pgi is the production and Pdi is the aggregated demand
at node i as before. This means that a mismatch between
production and demand causes the node i’s state variable to
drift away from its unforced behavior. Note that the number of
producers and consumers here are considered to be the same,
and we thus use the notation Pdi rather than Pdj which was
used in the previous section.
Let R be the incidence matrix of the graph G. Note that, by
associating an arbitrary orientation to the edges, the incidence
matrix R ∈ Rn×m is defined element-wise as Rik = 1, if node
i is the sink of edge k, dik = −1, if i is the source of edge
k, and Rik = 0 otherwise. In addition, kerR> = im1 for a
connected graph G. Then, (30) can be written in vector form
as
x˙ = y (31a)
My˙ = −Dy −R∇H(R>x) + Pg − Pd (31b)
where x = col(xi), M = blockdiag(Mi), D =
blockdiag(Di), Pg = col(Pgi), Pd = col(Pdi), i ∈ V . In
addition, col(∇Hij) is denoted by ∇H : Rm → Rm, where
the edge ordering in ∇H is the same as that of the incidence
matrix R. It is easy to see that (31) has non-isolated equilibria
for constant vectors Pg and Pd. In fact, given a solution (x, y)
of (31), (x+c1, y) is a solution to (31) as well, for any constant
c ∈ R. To avoid this complication, we perform a change of
coordinates by defining
ζi = xi − xn, i = 1, . . . , n− 1. (32)
This new set of coordinates can be also written as
ζ1
...
ζn−1
0
 =

x1
...
xn−1
xn
− 1xn.
Let Rζ ∈ Rn−1 × Rm denote the incidence matrix with its
n-th row removed. Then, by the equality above we have
R>x = R>ζ ζ,
where col(ζi) = ζ ∈ Rn−1. Moreover, it holds that ζ = E>x
where E> =
[
In−1 −1n−1
]
. Noting that R = ERζ , and
defining a function Hζ such that H(R>ζ ζ) = Hζ(ζ), and
thus Rζ∇H(R>ζ ζ) = ∇Hζ(ζ), the system (31) in the new
coordinates reads as
ζ˙ = E>y (33a)
My˙ = −Dy − E∇Hζ(ζ) + Pg − Pd, (33b)
6Remark 3. Note that the system above belongs to the class of
dynamical networks given by the feedback interconnection of
incrementally output feedback passive dynamics at the nodes
of the form [19]
y˙ = f(y, v, w)
z = h(y)
(34)
with h(y) = y, f(y, v, w) = M−1(−Dy + v + w), w =
Pg − Pd, and incrementally passive dynamics at the edges
ζ˙ = µ
σ = ∇Hζ(ζ). (35)
where the interconnection constraints are given by
µ = E>y, v = −Eσ.
We have opted to consider the system (33) rather than more
general subclasses of (34), (35), to keep the focus of the paper
and provide more explicit results.
As a result of the change of coordinates, the network (33)
now has at most one equilibrium, for given constant vector Pg
and Pd, and we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let Pg = P g and Pd = P d for some constant
vectors P g, P d ∈ Rn. Then the point (ζ, y) is an equilibrium
of (33) if and only if
y = 1y∗, y∗ =
∑
i∈V (P gi − P di)∑
i∈V Di
, (36)
∇Hζ(ζ) = E+(In − D11
>
1>D1
)(P g − P d), (37)
where E+ = (E>E)−1E>. Moreover, the equilibrium, if
exists, is unique.
Proof. See Appendix. 
B. Dynamic pricing mechanism
Next, we seek for a dynamic feedback (pricing mecha-
nism) that steers the physical network to an asymptotically
stable equilibrium, while guaranteeing the convergence of the
production and the demand to the Cournot-Nash solution. In
particular, we are interested to regulate the production Pg to
P ?g , the demand Pd to P
?
d , and attain the optimal price p
?
given by (29). Note that, statically setting the generation and
production as Pg = P ?g and Pd = P
?
d is undesirable as it
requires complete information of the entire network and utility
functions.
Recall that in the Cournot model, consumers are price
takers, meaning they optimize their utility functions given a
price. Consistent with (29b)-(29c) we consider the demand as
Pdi(t) = Q
−1
di (bdi − pi(t)), (38)
where pi(t) can be interpreted as a momentary or estimated
price for the ith consumer at time t. In vector form this is
written as Pd = Q−1d (bd − p(t)), with p(t) = col(pi(t)).
Next, looking at the expression of y∗ in Lemma 3, we notice
that the deviation from the supply-demand matching condition
(4) is reflected on the steady-state value of the state variable
y. In fact, (4) holds if and only if y∗ = 0. This motivates
the implementation of a negative feedback from y to Pg in
the controller. Moreover, in order to ensure optimality, we
rely on a communication layer next to the physical network
that appropriately distribute the information on the local price
estimations pi over the entire network. The topology of this
communication layer is modeled via an undirected connected
graph Gc(V, Ec), and the set of neighbors of the node i
is denoted by N ci . Inspired by the aforementioned remarks,
and motivated by some additional stability and optimality
considerations, the following distributed controller (pricing
mechanism) is proposed:
τip˙i = −kiyi −Q−1di yi −
∑
j∈N ci
ρij(pi − pj) (39a)
Pgi = ki(pi − bgi) (39b)
where τi > 0 is the time constant, ρij > 0 indicates the
weight of the communication at each link, and the constant
parameter ki > 0 will be specified later. Let T = diag(τi),
K = diag(ki), and the weighted Laplacian matrix of Gc
be denoted by L. Then the overall closed-system admits the
following state-space representation:
ζ˙ = E>y (40a)
My˙ = −Dy − E∇Hζ(ζ)
+K(p− bg)−Q−1d (bd − p) (40b)
T p˙ = −Lp−Ky −Q−1d y (40c)
The result below characterizes the static properties of the
closed-loop system (40).
Proposition 4. The point (ζ, y, p) is an equilibrium of (40) if
and only if y = 0,
p = 1nq, q =
1>Kbg + 1>Q−1d bd
1>K1+ 1>Q−1d 1
, (41)
and ζ satisfies
∇Hζ(ζ) = E+(P g − P d) (42)
with
P g = K(p− bg), P d = Q−1d (bd − p).
The equilibrium, if exists, is unique. Moreover, if K = (α∗In+
Qg)
−1, then (P g, P d, p) = (P ?g , P
?
d , p
?) given by (29).
Proof. Suppose that (ζ, y, p) is an equilibrium of (40). Then,
0 = E>y (43a)
0 = −Dy − E∇Hζ(ζ)
+K(p− bg)−Q−1d (bd − p) (43b)
0 = −Lp−Ky −Q−1d y. (43c)
By the first equality, we have y = 1y∗ for some y∗ ∈ R.
Substituting this into (43c), and multiplying both sides of
(43c) from the left by 1>, we obtain that y∗ = 0. Hence,
(43c) results in p = 1q for some q ∈ R. The fact that q
is given by (41), and that (42) holds, follow from suitable
algebraic manipulations analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.
7The converse result as well as uniqueness of the equilibrium
also follow analogous to Lemma 3.
By (41), we have
(1 + α∗1>K1)q = β∗ + α∗1>Kbg
where α∗ and β∗ are given by (17). The equality above can
be written as q = β∗ − α∗1>K(1q − bg), which yields
q = β∗ − α∗1>P g. (44)
Equivalently, we have K−1K(1q − bg) + bg = 1β∗ −
α∗11>P g, and hence
(α∗11> +K−1)P g = 1β∗ − bg.
By setting K = (α∗In + Qg)−1, the equality above returns
P g = P
?
g , with P
?
g given by (24a). Then, by comparing (44)
to (24c), we find that q = p?. Finally,
P d = Q
−1
d (bd − 1q) = Q−1d (bd − 1β∗ + α∗11>P ?g ) = P ?d ,
where the second equality follows from (44), and the last one
from (24b). 
Remark 4. In case of linear dynamics, namely 2Hζ(ζ) =
ζ>RζWR>ζ ζ, W > 0, the vector ζ is explicitly obtained as
ζ = (RζWR
>
ζ )
−1E+(P g − P d).
Proposition 4 imposes the following assumption:
Assumption 3. There exists ζ ∈ Rn−1 such that (42) is
satisfied.
Remark 5. As evident from (37), the condition in Assumption
3 is a consequence of the agents’ dynamics (30), rather than
the choice of the controller. In case the graph G is a tree, the
incidence matrix has full column rank and Assumption 3 is
always satisfied with
ζ = (R+ζ )
>∇H−1((R>R)−1R>(P g − P d))
where R+ζ is a right inverse of Rζ , and ∇H(∇H−1(x)) =
x, ∀x ∈ Rm.
The next theorem provides the main result of this section,
which validates the proposed feedback algorithm.
Theorem 3. Let Assumption 3 hold. Then, the equilibrium
(ζ, y, p) of (40) is asymptotically stable. Moreover, for K =
(α∗In + Qg)−1, the vector (Pg, Pd, p), with Pg defined as
in (39b) and Pd as in (38), asymptotically converges to the
optimal Cournot-Nash solution (P ?g , P
?
d , p
?), the latter given
by (29).
Proof. To prove asymptotic stability, we consider the Lya-
punov function candidate
V =
1
2
(y − y)>M(y − y) + 1
2
(p− p)>T (p− p) +H(ζ)
where H takes the form of the Bregman distance between ζ, ζ
associated with the distance-generating function H(ζ) and the
point ζ, namely [23]
H(ζ) = H(ζ)−H(ζ)− (ζ − ζ)> ∂H
∂ζ
∣∣∣∣
ζ
.
Since H is strictly convex, the Bregman distance H is non-
negative and is equal to zero whenever ζ = ζ. Then, clearly
the function V has a strict minimum at (ζ, y, p). Computing
the time derivative of V along the solutions of (40) yields
V˙ = −(y − y)>D(y − y)− (p− p)>L(p− p),
where we have used (43) together with the fact that
∂H
∂ζ
=
∂H
∂ζ
− ∂H
∂ζ
∣∣∣∣
ζ
.
As V is positive definite, and V˙ is nonpositive, we conclude
that solutions of (40) are bounded. By invoking LaSalle’s in-
variance principle, on the invariant set we have y = y, Lp =
Lp. Noting that y = 0 and Lp = 0, we find that each point
on the invariant set is an equilibrium of (40). By Proposition
4, the equilibrium is unique, and therefore the invariant set
comprises only the equilibrium point (ζ, 0, p) given by (41)
and (42). By continuity, the vectors Pg and Pd asymptotically
converge to P g = K(p − bg) and P d = Q−1d (bd − p),
respectively. For K = (α∗In + Qg)−1, by Proposition 4
we have (P g, P d, p) = (P ?g , P
?
d , p
?). This completes the
proof. 
Remark 6. By Theorem 3, the controller (39) with ki =
(α∗+Qgi)−1, steers the network to the Cournot-Nash optimal
solution. Note that, with the exception of the parameter α∗, the
i-th controller uses only the local variables at node i together
with the communicated variables pi − pj of the neighboring
nodes in the communication graph. If the parameter α∗ is not
precisely known, then ki is set to (αˆ∗i + Qgi)
−1 where αˆ∗i is
an approximation of α∗ at node i. This approximation will
shift the equilibrium of the closed-loop system away from the
one associated with the Cournot-Nash solution. However, by
Theorem 3, asymptotic stability will not be jeopardized, local
price variables will synchronize, and the vector (Pg, Pd, p)
will converge to the point (P g, P d, p) given in Lemma 4. The
investigation of how far the equilibrium is from the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium in the presence of uncertainty on α∗ is left
for future research.
Remark 7. When α∗ is not precisely known, another possibil-
ity is to estimate the parameter in advance, as utility functions
are not frequently changing. To this end, one can implement
a distributed algorithm such as
χ˙ij = αˆi − αˆj , {i, j} ∈ Ec (45a)
˙ˆαi =
1
n
−Q−1di αˆi −
∑
j∈N ci
κijχij , i ∈ V (45b)
which requires local parameter Qdi, communicated variables
χij , and assumes that each controller is aware of the total
number of participating agents, namely n. It is easy to see
that αˆ asymptotically converges to α∗ = (1>Q−1d 1)
−1. While
it is difficult to provide analytical guarantees for the online
use of this estimator in the controller (39), our numerical
investigation in Section IV validates stability and performance
of such a scheme.
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Fig. 1. The solid lines denote the transmission lines, and the dashed lines
depict the communication links. The edge weights indicate the susceptance
of the transmission lines.
IV. CASE STUDY
We illustrate the proposed pricing mechanism on a specific
example of a network with producers and consumers, namely
a four area power network [6], see [24] on how a four area
network equivalent can be obtained for the IEEE New England
39-bus system or the South Eastern Australian 59-bus. The
power network model we consider here is given by the so-
called swing equation [22], and is mathematically equivalent
to the dynamics in (33), under the assumption that voltages
are constant and the frequency dynamics is decoupled from
the reactive power flow. In this case, ζ is the vector of phase
angles measured with respect to the phase angle of a reference
bus (area 4), y is the vector of frequency deviations from the
nominal frequency (50/60Hz), and the diagonal matrices M
and D collect the inertia and damping constants. The vectors
Pg and Pd denote the vector of generation and demand as
before. The numerical values of the system parameters are
provided in Table I. The physical and communication graphs,
namely G and Gc, are depicted in Figure 1, where the solid and
dotted edges denote the transmission lines and communication
links, respectively.
For each {i, j} ∈ E , the (locally convex) function Hij in
(30) is given by −|Bij |ViVj cos(xi−xj), where Bij < 0 is the
susceptance of the line {i, j}, and Vi and xi are the voltage
magnitude and voltage phase angle at the ith area (bus). In
(33), this yields the expression
∇H = RζW sin(R>ζ ξ),
where W = diag(wk), with wk := BijViVj , k ∼ {i, j}, and
sin(·) is interpreted elementwise.
We consider linear-quadratic cost and utility functions given
by (12), (13), with the parameters provided in Table I.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Areas 1 2 3 4
Mi 5.22 3.98 4.49 4.22
Di 1.60 1.22 1.38 1.42
Qgi 1.50 4.50 3.00 6.00
bgi 0.60 1.05 1.50 2.70
Qdi 1.50 2.25 3.60 6.00
bdi 6.00 5.00 7.00 8.00
τi 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.50
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Fig. 2. Numerical simulation of the closed-loop system (40).
We consider the distributed controller in (39), and we set
ρij = 1, for each {i, j} ∈ Ec. The closed-loop system (40) is
initially at steady-state. At time t = 5s, we modify the utility
functions by increasing bd by 25 percent, which results in a
step in the demand. The response of the closed-loop system to
this change is shown in Figure 2, where the values are in per
unit with respect to a base power of 1000MVA. As can be seen
in the figure, at steady-state the frequency is regulated to its
nominal value, which indicates that the matching condition (4)
is satisfied. The local prices converge to the same value which
identifies the market clearing price p?. As desired, the triple
(Pg, Pd, p) converge to the Cournot-Nash optimal solution
P ?g =

2.05
0.77
0.96
0.34
 , P ?d =

1.67
0.56
1.04
0.83
 , p? = 4.99. (46)
Next, we consider the case where the parameter α∗ is unknown
and is identified in real-time by the estimator (45). This results
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Fig. 3. Numerical simulation of the closed-loop system (47).
in the closed-loop dynamics
ζ˙ = E>y (47a)
My˙ = −Dy − E∇Hζ(ζ)
+ (αˆIn +Qg)
−1(p− bg)−Q−1d (bd − p) (47b)
T p˙ = −Lp− (αˆIn +Qg)−1y −Q−1d y (47c)
χ˙ = R>c αˆ (47d)
˙ˆα =
1
n
1−Q−1d αˆ−Rcχ, (47e)
where Rc denotes the incidence matrix of the communication
graph, and we have set κij = 1 for simplicity. The system is
initially at steady-state. At time t = 5s, we modify as before
the utility functions by increasing bd by 25 percent. At the
same time, we decrease the elements of Qd by 20 percent,
which modifies the actual value of α according to (17). For
a better comparison to the system without the estimator, the
initial value of Qd is chosen such that its new value will be
equal to the one provided in Table I. The response of the
closed-loop system (47) is illustrated in Figure 3. As can be
seen from the figure, frequency is regulated to its nominal
value and the triple (Pg, Pd, p) converge again to the one given
by (46). This means that the controller (39) equipped with the
estimator (45) is able to steer the network to the Cournot-Nash
optimal solution. Note that compared to Figure 2, the transient
performance is only slightly degraded.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a distributed feedback algorithm that
steers a dynamical network to a prescribed equilibrium cor-
responding to the so-called Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We
characterized this equilibrium for linear-quadratic utility and
cost functions, and specified the algebraic conditions under
which the production and the demand are strictly positive
for all agents. For a class of passive nonlinear second-order
systems, where production and demands act as external in-
puts to the systems, we devised a control algorithm (pricing
mechanism) that guarantees the convergence of the closed loop
system to the optimal equilibrium point associated with the
previously characterized Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Consid-
ering a different type of competition such as Bertrand and
Stackelberg games, as well as a thorough comparison of the
equilibrium points resulting from competitive games against
those obtained from a social welfare problem are of interest
for future research.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: From Corollary 1, it follows that the
first two statements are equivalent, and they imply the third
statement. It remains to show that 3)⇒2). Now, suppose that
the third statement holds. From Pd = Q−1d (b − 1p), using
again Corollary 1, we obtain that p ≤ bdj for all j ∈ J . The
condition p 6= bd yields p < bd, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2: 1)⇒2) Suppose that the first statement
holds. Then, by Proposition 3, we have
Pg = (2αI +Qg)
−1(β1− bg + α(I − 11>)Pg). (48)
This is equivalent to αPg + α11>Pg + QgPg = β1 − bg,
and to Pg = (α(I + 11>) + Qg)−1(β1 − bg). Hence, (21)
is obtained. This also shows the uniqueness of the solution.
Now, note that (α(I + 11>) + Qg)Pg = β1 − bg, which is
equivalent to (αI +Qg)Pg = 1(β − α1>Pg)− bg. Element-
wise, this can be written as (α+Qgi)Pgi = β−α1>Pg−bgi.
Since Pgi > 0 for all i, we obtain that β − α1>Pg > bg .
2)⇒3) Next, suppose that the second statement of the
lemma holds. Then, using the same chain of equivalences
as above, we obtain (48). Therefore, by Proposition 3, we
must have that γi(P−gi)>0 for all i ∈ I . Without loss of
generality, assume that bg1 = bg . Suppose by contradiction
that γ1(P−g1) ≤ 0. Then, we have Pg1 = 0, and thus
β − bg − α1>Pg = 0. This contradicts the inequality in the
second statement of the lemma, which completes this part of
the proof.
3)⇒1) Now, let the third statement hold, and set
Pˆg := (α(I + 11
>) +Qg)−1(β1− bg), Pˆg ∈ Rn>0. (49)
Again, the vector Pˆg can be written in analogy to (48) as Pˆgi =
(2α+Qgi)
−1(β−bgi−α1>Pˆ−gi) for every component i ∈ I .
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For every i ∈ I , since Pˆgi > 0, then (2α+Qgi)−1(β − bgi −
α1>Pˆ−gi) > 0, which is equivalent to say that γi(Pˆ−gi) > 0.
Hence, the vector Pˆg satisfies (20), and is therefore a solution
to (19) beloging to the interior of the positive orthant.
3)⇔4) To complete the proof of the lemma, it suffices to
show that the last two statements of the lemma are equivalent,
namely
Pˆg ∈ Rn>0 ⇔ 1>(α(I + 11>) +Qg)−1(β1− bg) ≤
β − bg
α
,
where Pˆg is given by (49). From (49), we have (α(I+11>)+
Qg)Pˆg = β1 − bg, which is equivalent to (αI + Qg)Pˆg =
1(β − α1>Pˆg) − bg. Element-wise, this can be written as
(α+Qgi)Pˆgi = β − α1>Pˆg − bgi. Therefore, Pˆgi > 0 if and
only if β−α1>Pˆg > bg . By replacing Pˆg with (α(I+11>)+
Qg)
−1(β1−bg), we see that the latter inequality is equivalent
to (22).
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose that (ζ, y) is an equilibrium of
(33). Then,
0 = E>y (50a)
0 = −Dy − E∇Hζ(ζ) + P g − P d. (50b)
Hence, we find that y = 1nyˆ for some yˆ ∈ R, and
0 = −D1yˆ − E∇Hζ(ζ) + P g − P d. (51)
By multiplying both sides of the equality above from the left
by 1>, we find yˆ = y∗, where the latter is given by (36).
By replacing the expression of y∗ back to the equality (51),
and noting that E has full column rank, the equality (37) is
obtained.
Conversely, assume that a point (ζ, y) satisfies (36) and (37).
Clearly, E>y = 0. Moreover, note that
(In − D11
>
1>D1
)(P g − P d) ∈ (im1n)⊥ = imE.
Hence, multiplying both sides of (37) from the left by E gives
E∇Hζ(ζ) = (In − D11
>
1>D1
)(P g − P d).
By the definition of y in (36), the equality above can be written
as (50b), and therefore (ζ, y) is an equilibrium of (33). For
uniqueness of the equilibrium, it suffices to show that
∇Hζ(ζ) = ∇Hζ(ζ˜) for some ζ, ζ˜ ∈ Rn−1 =⇒ ζ = ζ˜.
The equality ∇Hζ(ζ)−∇Hζ(ζ˜) = 0 is equivalent to
Rζ∇H(R>ζ ζ)−Rζ∇H(R>ζ ζ˜) = 0.
Multiplying both sides of the equality above from the left by
(ζ− ζ˜)> returns (R>ζ ζ−R>ζ ζ˜)>(∇H(R>ζ ζ)−∇H(R>ζ ζ˜)) =
0. By strict convexity of H , we find that R>ζ ζ = R
>
ζ ζ˜. The
fact that Rζ has full row rank yields ζ = ζ˜, which completes
the proof.
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